With the dust of the election finally settled, the new king has been anointed. Siddaramaiah, a senior leader of the Indian National Congress (INC, or Congress), became Chief Minister of Karnataka once again on May 20th. He had previously served in the office from 2013–2018.

D. K. Shivakumar has begrudgingly taken the second post of Deputy Chief Minister. It remains to be seen if he will continue to stand on the sideline, as history tells us that chief ministers usually have a hard time completing their terms in this state. In the 66 years of its modern political history, Karnataka has seen only four instances of chief ministers completing their terms. The last one, though, was Siddaramaiah himself.

A brief history

The roots of this anomaly lie in the 20th-century unification movement that led to the formation of the state. This movement aimed to bring together various regions, uniting the territory of the former Mysore Kingdom with parts of Hyderabad and Bombay states, along with the districts of Ballari, Dakshina Kannada and Kodagu. These regions shared a common language, Kannada. 

Despite the unification of the state into a single administrative entity, politics in Karnataka remained highly regionalized. This resulted in a system with a weak center and regional strongmen holding considerable sway over policy, often demanding plum posts for their supporters. Winning in Karnataka means effectively winning six different elections, each with its own unique characteristics. To have a chance at forming a government without a coalition, a political party must perform exceptionally well in at least three regions and achieve above-average results in at least two others.

Throughout the state’s 66 years of existence, Congress has historically emerged as the dominant political force, governing the state for approximately 50 years. As in any other Indian election, caste plays a crucial role in determining electoral outcomes here. Before the unification of Karnataka, the Vokkaligas, a landholding community, held considerable sway within the Congress party of Mysore state. Concerned about potentially relinquishing power to the numerically superior Lingayats, a dominant Shaivite caste in the northern regions that were to be added to the state, several Vokkaliga leaders voiced their opposition to the unification. Their fears were not unfounded: after unification, Lingayats swiftly captured power within Congress and also took the coveted post of chief minister.  They continued to dominate Congress late into the 1980s.

The turning point came when Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi unceremoniously dismissed Chief Minister Veerendra Patil in a press conference over his handling of a communal riot. This “humiliation” by the national party prompted the entire Lingayat community to fully align itself with the then-nascent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under B. S. Yediyurappa, a loyalty that has endured ever since.

The capture of Congress by the Lingayat community had created the need for a strong Vokkaliga leader who could unite them into a formidable force. H. D. Devegowda and his Janata Dal party (JD), quickly filled this void, experiencing a rapid rise with full support of the community. This resurgence led to the Vokkaligas reclaiming the post of chief minister after nearly four decades, and, to their delight, even the post of prime minister, albeit for only a year from 1996–1997. In 1999, the party split and Devegowda’s faction became the Janata Dal (Secular), or JD(S)

Twenty years ago, H. D. Kumaraswamy, the son of Devegowda, took over the reins from his father and has since served as chief minister twice.

With these two dominant castes fighting for power, a third alternative emerged in the form of “Ahinda”—an alliance between religious minorities, backward castes and Dalits. The alliance masterminded by former Chief Minister Devraj Urs has found its torchbearer in Siddaramaiah today. These are the three corners of the triangular fight that has dominated Karnataka politics for the past three decades.

The Lingayat blunder

The previous assembly elections in 2018 had returned a hung assembly, with the BJP as the single largest party. However, Congress and JD(S) managed to stitch together an alliance with H. D. Kumaraswamy as chief minister.

A year into the government, discontent grew and 12 legislators belonging to both coalition partners defected to the BJP and formed a government with B. S. Yediyurappa at the helm. He was a leader of great stature, with a massive following in the state. He had toiled to build the BJP in Karnataka, the party’s only home in the South. His style of working often clashed with the ever-centralizing impulse of BJP high command. 

When the conflict between the state and national parties reached a deadlock, Amit Shah and BJP leadership used a clause within the party charter that mandated a compulsory retirement at the age of 75 to force Yediyurappa out. Cognizant of the Lingayat community’s sentiments, they tried to placate them by appointing Basavraj Bommai, another Lingayat, as the chief minister for the remainder of the term. But the damage was already done. Bommai was a political lightweight who could never fit into Yediyurappa’s shoes.

Adding to this, the BJP also decided to endorse former CM and Lingayat leader Jagadish Shettar, a six-time elected member, and to former Deputy CM Laxman Savadi a month before the elections. Both leaders joined Congress, and their supporters followed en masse, further adding credibility to their claims that “BJP is anti-Lingayat.” Even though Shettar lost, the gamble worked in Congress’ favor, with the party sweeping Hyderabad and Mumbai Karnataka regions with a majority of Lingayat votes.

Hindutva vs. Kannada pride

After the leadership change, the BJP thought it could offset potential losses on Lingayat votes by building a pan-religious identity with Hindutva, focusing on national, Hindu identity. While the monsoon ravaged the infrastructure of the capital Bangalore, the government busied itself thinking about hijabs in schools and boycotts of halal products. This aggressive push was spearheaded by C. T. Ravi, a rising star in the state party. However, this imported version of Hindutva from the northern regions failed to resonate with the people of Karnataka. While Hindutva politics can be seen as an acceptable side dish, it cannot serve as the main course. Consequently, Ravi lost his seat, and the BJP drew a blank in his district, Chikmagalur.

Hindutva comes with a natural tendency to homogenize people under a broad blanket of Hindi and Hinduism. The former is a huge challenge in the South, where language forms a fundamental part of identity.  In Karnataka, the BJP was seen as neglecting the interests of the Kannada language and cozying up to New Delhi’s edicts. Moreover, the non-payment of goods and services taxes owed to the state and the promotion of Gujarat’s Amul dairy cooperative over the local Nandini brand contributed to this narrative, heightening concerns about the erosion of local autonomy.

Administrative Failure

Meanwhile, the BJP faced failures on the administrative front as well. The contractor’s association held a press conference and alleged that ministers within the government were demanding cuts as high as 40% for projects, making it infeasible for them to operate. Congress, under the guidance of their consultant Sunil Kanugolu (formerly of McKinsey & Company) latched on to this and launched a campaign: “40% Sarkara” (40% Government). The campaign prominently featured posters with the phrase “Pay CM,” cleverly playing on the popular payment network “Paytm,”  with an accompanying QR code to “pay bribes.” The campaign was a hit on social media, tilting the narrative battle towards Congress. 

The BJP faced the polls with a sinking ship and an unreliable captain; the best they could hope for was a hung assembly. When the results were out, they could only hold on to their bastions in the capital, Bangalore, and coastal Karnataka. 11 ministers lost their seats, with the party drawing a blank in 8 districts. Their only silver lining was their vote share, which remained unchanged (~36%).

Meanwhile, Congress increased their vote share by a decisive ~5% (38% to 43%)  at the cost of JD(S) and Kumaraswamy (18.3% to 13.3%). Congress’s remarkable victory in the Old Mysore region can be attributed to Vokkaligas uniting behind the Karnataka Congress chief, D. K. Shivakumar. With Rahul Gandhi once again favoring Siddaramaiah and accommodating Shivakumar with a deputy role, it remains to be seen if this Vokkaliga support will extend to the crucial upcoming national elections next year.

What Next?

This election victory was a hard-fought victory for the Congress. They needed the organizational skills of Shivakumar as well as the personal charisma of Siddaramaiah to win. The two leaders realized this and buried their differences to face the elections as a single unit. But now that victory is theirs, the gloves are off and it appears that the government might not be frictionless. 

Rahul Gandhi is banking on the duo to deliver a major chunk of seats in the all-important national elections next May. It will be an uphill task, considering that Congress managed to win only one out of the 28 seats in the last elections. The BJP on the other hand is completely decimated and is in soul-searching mode, without a strong leader who can deliver the only potential set of Southern seats to Narendra Modi. 

However, history has shown that the people of Karnataka possess a commendable level of political maturity, often making a clear distinction between state and national issues, and consequently casting their votes differently. Only time will tell if the Congress can successfully capitalize on this opportunity, or if the BJP can find a way to reclaim its lost ground.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.